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Abstract
The processing and storage of critical data in large-scale
cloud networks necessitate the need for scalable security so-
lutions. It has been shown that deploying all possible security
measures incurs a cost on performance by using up valuable
computing and networking resources which are the primary
selling points for cloud service providers. Thus, there has
been a recent interest in developing Moving Target Defense
(MTD) mechanisms that helps one optimize the joint objec-
tive of maximizing security while ensuring that the impact
on performance is minimized. Often, these techniques model
the problem of multi-stage attacks by stealthy adversaries as
a single-step attack detection game using graph connectivity
measures as a heuristic to measure performance, thereby (1)
losing out on valuable information that is inherently present
in graph-theoretic models designed for large cloud networks,
and (2) coming up with certain strategies that have asymmet-
ric impacts on performance. In this work, we leverage knowl-
edge in attack graphs of a cloud network in formulating a
zero-sum Markov Game and use the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) to come up with meaningful utility
values for this game. Then, we show that the optimal strat-
egy of placing detecting mechanisms against an adversary is
equivalent to computing the mixed Min-max Equilibrium of
the Markov Game. We compare the gains obtained by using
our method to other techniques presently used in cloud net-
work security, thereby showing its effectiveness. Finally, we
highlight how the method was used for a small real-world
cloud system.
Introduction
A cloud service provider provides processing and storage
hardware along with networking resources to customers for
profit. Although a cloud provider might want to use state-of-
the-art security protocols, vulnerabilities in software desired
or run by customers can put sensitive information stored in
or communicated over the cloud at risk.
Distributed elements such as firewalls, Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS), log monitoring systems etc. have been
the backbone to detect (or stop) malicious traffic enter-
ing such systems. Unfortunately, the scale of modern-day
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Figure 1: An example cloud network scenario in which an
attacker can take various attack paths and the defender wants
to find a strategy for placing intrusion detection systems.
cloud systems makes the placement of all possible de-
tecting and monitoring mechanisms an expensive solution
(Jha, Sheyner, and Wing 2002; Venkatesan et al. 2016;
Sengupta et al. 2018), using up the computing and network
resources of the cloud that could have been better utilized by
giving to customers which in turn would be better for busi-
ness. Thus, the question of how one should place a limited
number of detection mechanisms to limit the impact on per-
formance while ensuring that the security of the system is
not drastically reduced becomes a significant one.
There has been an effort to answer this question in previ-
ous research works (Venkatesan et al. 2016; Sengupta et al.
2018). Researchers have pointed out that a static placement
of detection systems is guaranteed to be insecure because an
attacker, with reconnaissance on their side (which is there
by design), will eventually learn this static placement and
thereby avoid it. Thus, dynamic placement of these detec-
tion mechanisms has become a default. Such an approach
is popularly known as Moving Target Defense (MTD) and
can be used for shifting the detection surface where the set
of attacks monitored changes in some randomized way after
every time step, thereby introducing uncertainty if an attack
will be caught. Although one can vary the length of this time
step to introduce further complexity, we assume, similar to
a majority of work done in the MTD community, this time
step is fixed and decided beforehand.
Previous work often treats the cloud system in a way sim-
ilar to that of a physical security system where the primary
challenge is to allocate a limited set of security recourses
(IDS) to an asset/schedule (network/host) that needs to be
protected (Paruchuri et al. 2008; Sinha et al. 2015). In the
case of cloud-systems, a global dynamic allocation strat-
egy has two major problems. First, the treatment of multi-
step attacks as single-step attacks as individual and inde-
pendent attacks leads to the sub-optimal placement of detec-
tion mechanisms because they are inherently myopic failing
to effectively leverage the information present in the sys-
tem design. Such strategies, for example, may prioritize de-
tection a high-impact attack on a web-server more than a
low-impact attack on a path that leads an attack to a stor-
age server, which when exploited may have major conse-
quences. Second, these methods can come up with strate-
gies where pure strategies where multiple detection systems
are placed on the same host have high non-zero probabili-
ties, leading to degradation of performance (for a customer
situated) on that host more than others.
In this paper, we try to address these problems by mod-
eling the cloud system as a Markov Game. A sub-networks
in the cloud network, determined using the system’s Attack
Graph (AG), represents the states of our game. The attacker
actions correspond to real-world attacks determined using
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits (CVEs) found in
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the defender
actions correspond to the placement of detection systems
that can detect these (known) attacks. We design the rewards
of this game by leveraging the inherent security knowl-
edge present in the Common Vulnerability Scoring Systems
(CVSS). This helps us design defender strategies that take
into account the long-term impacts of multi-stage attacks
while ensuring that the defender picks a limited number of
monitoring actions in each state of the game. The latter en-
sures the placement of detection mechanisms that do not af-
fect the performance asymmetrically in the different parts of
the network. The key contributions of this research work are:
• We design an attack graph based multi-stage attack anal-
ysis method leveraging Markov Game Modeling to opti-
mize the cost incurred and the security provided by detec-
tion mechanisms in a multi-tenant cloud network.
• We show that the Markov Game strategy for the place-
ment of IDS performs better than other static and random-
ization strategies–the improvement margin widens when
the size of the sub-net modeled in a state increases in size
and the discount factor of the game approaches one.
• We showcase the effectiveness of our approach on a small
scale real-world scenario.
Related Work
In (Jha, Sheyner, and Wing 2002), the authors present a for-
mal analysis of attacks on a network with cost-benefit anal-
ysis and about potential security measures to defend against
the network attacks. In (Chowdhary, Pisharody, and Huang
2016), authors provide a polynomial time method for attack
graph construction and network reconfiguration using a par-
allel computing approach, making it possible to reason about
known multi-stage attacks in large-scale systems.
Authors in (Jia, Sun, and Stavrou 2013) introduced the
idea of moving secret proxies to new network locations us-
ing a greedy algorithm that can thwart brute force and DDoS
attacks. In (Zhuang et al. 2013), Zhuang et. al. show that if
intelligent adaptations are used along with these MTD sys-
tems, the effectiveness is improved further. In (Sengupta et
al. 2017a) authors show that intelligent strategies based on
common intuitions can be detrimental to security and high-
light how game theoretic reasoning can alleviate the prob-
lem. On those lines, (Lye and Wing 2005) and (Sengupta
et al. 2018) use a game-theoretic approach to model the
attacker-defender interaction as a two-player game where
they calculate the optimal response for the players using
the Nash and the Stackelberg Equilibrium concepts respec-
tively. Although they propose the use of the Markov De-
cision Process (MDP) and attack graph-based approaches,
they leave it as future work. The flavor of these approaches
is similar to those of Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs)
that have been used extensively in multiple physical se-
curity applications highlighted in (Paruchuri et al. 2008;
Sinha et al. 2015).
In the context of cloud systems, (Peng et al. 2014) dis-
cusses a risk-aware MTD strategy where they model the at-
tack surface as a non-decreasing probability density function
and then estimate the risk of migrating a VM to a replace-
ment node using probabilistic inference. In (Kampanakis,
Perros, and Beyene 2014), authors highlight obfuscation as
a possible MTD strategy in order to deal with attacks like
OS fingerprinting and network reconnaissance in the SDN
environment. Furthermore, they highlight that the trade-off
between such random mutations, which may disrupt any ac-
tive services, require analysis of cost-benefits.
In this paper, we identify an adaptive MTD strategy
against multi-hop monotonic attacks for cloud networks
which optimizes for performance while providing gains in
security. The ability to decompose a large cloud network into
sub-nets provides gains in computing strategies, a fair distri-
bution of IDS resources and prioritizing detection of attacks
that may have long-term impacts.
Due to lack of solution methods for analyzing the impact
of strategically moving the detection surface on multi-stage
attacks in cloud systems, we evaluate the effectiveness our
defense strategy against two attack strategies– one static and
the other dynamic– on a simple cloud system.
Background
In this section, we first introduce our reader to some termi-
nology and the threat model. We then describe a small cloud
network scenario that we will use throughout the paper as a
representative example to elucidate our ideas.
Vulnerability is a security flaw in a software service
hosted over a given port, that when exploited by a malicious
attacker, can cause loss of Confidentiality, Availability or In-
tegrity (CIA) of that virtual machine (VM).
Figure 2: Attack Graph for the example cloud network sce-
nario shown above.
Threat Model
Consider the cloud system in Figure 1, where the attacker
has user-level access to the LDAP server, which is the initial
state of our game and the goal state is to compromise the
FTP server. The attacker can perform actions such as exploit-
LDAP, exploit-Web, exploit-FTP. In the scenario shown, the
attacker has two possible attack paths it can take to reach the
goal node priv(attacker, (FTP: root)), i.e.
• Path 1: exploit-LDAP→ exploit-FTP
• Path 2: exploit-LDAP→ exploit-Web→ exploit-FTP
The Admin can choose to monitor (1) services running on
the host and access to sensitive files in the system, and
(2) network traffic along both the paths using the network
and host-based monitoring agents, e.g., monitor-LDAP,
monitor-FTP, etc. We assume that the Admin has resource
constraints and thus, wants to perform monitoring in an
optimized fashion. On the other hand, the attacker should
try to perform attacks that have lets it achieve the goal with
the highest probability, i.e. avoid being detected by the
Admin. To model this kind of attack behavior, we utilize the
well-established notion of Attack Graphs (AGs).
Attack Graph G = {N,E} consists of a set of nodes (N)
and a set of edges (E) where,
• As shown in the Figure 2, the nodes (N) of attack graph
can be denoted by N = {Nf ∪ Nc ∪ Nd ∪ Nr}. Here
Nf denotes primitive/fact nodes (square boxes in Fig 2),
Nc denotes the exploit (blue circles in Fig 2), Nd denotes
the privilege level (diamond-shaped boxes in Fig. 2) and
Nr represents the root or goal node (diamond-shaped box
with double border);
• The edges (E) of the attack graph can be denoted by
E = {Epre∪Epost}. HereEpre ⊆ (Nf∪Nc)×(Nd∪Nr)
ensures that pre-conditions Nc and Nf must be met to
achieve Nd, i.e., fact (netAccess(VM)) and exploit condi-
tions (vulExists(VM)) should be true for achieving post-
condition Nd or Nr, e.g., root(VM). Epost ⊆ (Nd ∪
Nr) × (Nf ∪ Nc) means post-condition Nd or Nr can
be achieved on satisfaction of Nf and Nc.
Two-Player Markov Games
Having defined the notion of Attack Graphs, we now intro-
duce the concept of Markov Games. Later, we shall see how
the information present in attack graphs will be used to de-
fine the various aspects of our Markov Game.
Markov Game (Shapley 1953) for two players P1 and P2
can be defined by the tuple (S,A1, A2, τ, R, γ) where,
• S = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sk} are finite states of the game,
• A1 = {a11, a21, . . . , am1 } represents the possible finite ac-
tion sets for P1,
• A2 = {a12, a22, . . . , an2} are finite action sets for P2,• τ(s, a1, a2, s′) is the probability of reaching a state s′ ∈ S
for state s if P1 and P2 take actions a1 and a2 respectively,
• Ri(s, a1, a2) is the reward obtained by Pi if in state s, Pi
and P−i take the actions a1 and a2 respectively, and
• γi 7→ [0, 1) is the discount factor for player i. In the rest
of the paper, we assume ∀i γi = γ.
The concept of the optimal policy for a player Pi in this
game is defined as the selection of the action that optimizes
the value of a being in any state s while reasoning over
the expectation of (1) underlying domain stochasticity (de-
fined by τ and similar to Markov Decision Processes) and
(2) reasoning over the other’s player P−i action space. This
is generally done by finding a min-max policy over the ac-
tion spaces of both the players in each state, similar to solu-
tion strategies in normal (i.e. matrix) or extender form games
(Littman 1994).
Now, notice that in a two-player Markov Game, each state
represents a Matrix Game and the policy in each game is not
only based on maximizing the reward in this game but also
reasoning about the reward to go, which in turn is depen-
dent on the games that you are yet to play. Thus, the max-
min strategy seeks to maximize the value for the max player
given that the min player selects the pure strategy that gives
the minimum pay-off to the max player. To prevent being
second-guessed by the min player, the max player should
play a mixed strategy, i.e. have a probability distribution
over the actions it can play. To formalize this, let us define
the Q-values for an action a1 taken by the max player P1 in
state s, given that P2 selects a2, is defined as,
Q(s, a1, a2) = R(s, a1, a2) + γ
∑
s′
τ(s, a1, a2, s
′) · V (s′) (1)
Let the mixed policy for state s as pi(s), which is a vector of
length m that represents the probability distribution that P1
can has over the possible m actions it can take in state s. We
can now define the value of state s for P1 using the equation,
V (s) = max
pi(s)
min
a2
∑
a1
Q(s, a1, a2) · pia1 (2)
VM Vulnerability CVE CIA AC
LDAP Local Privilege
Escalation
CVE-2016-
5195
5.0 MEDIUM
Web
Server
Cross Site
Scripting
CVE-2017-
5095
7.0 EASY
FTP Remote Code
Execution
CVE-2015-
3306
10.0 MEDIUM
Table 1: Vulnerability Information for the Cloud Network
Scoring Metrics for Vulnerabilities and Exploits
Software security is defined in terms of Confidentiality, In-
tegration, and Availability (McCumber 1991). In a broad
sense, an attack on a web application is defined as a act that
compromises any of these characteristics.
In the three VMs shown above– an LDAP server, an FTP
server, and a web server– the vulnerabilities present in each
of them can be mapped to (known) CVE. These vulnerabil-
ities correspond to the attacker’s actions, along with a brief
description, are shown in Table 1.
The use of the Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem (CVSS) for rating attacks is well studied in security
(Houmb, Franqueira, and Engum 2010). For (most) CVEs
listed in the NVD database, we have a six-dimensional
CVSS v2 vector,which can be decomposed into multiple
components that represent Access Complexity (AC), i.e.
how difficult it is to exploit a vulnerability, and the impact
on Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) gained
by exploiting a vulnerability. The values of AC are categor-
ical {EASY, MEDIUM, HIGH}, while CIA values are in
the range [0, 10] and are shown for each CVE in Table 1.
Game Theoretic Modeling
In this section, we describe, with the help of the exam-
ple cloud system mentioned above, how the problem of
placing detection systems can be formulated as a zero-sum
Markov Game. The use of a Markov Game model comes
with two implicit assumptions– (1) attacks can be mod-
eled using a Markovian model and (2) both the players
have full observability of the state. Beyond these, we as-
sume (1) there is a list of attacks known to both the de-
fender and the attacker (but cannot be fixed either due
to lack of manpower or restrictions from third-party who
host their code on the cloud network (Jajodia et al. 2018;
Sengupta et al. 2018)) and (2) the attacker can be in any node
in the system and remain undetected until it attempts to ex-
ploit an existing vulnerability, i.e. stealthy attacker (Venkate-
san et al. 2016).
States
We view the states of our Markov Game as an abstraction
over a set of Nf ∪ Nd ∪ Nr nodes in the Attack Graph
(AG). In our example, these correspond to all the grey col-
ored nodes in Figure 2. A valid abstraction or state-space for-
mulation for our Markov Game must satisfy two properties.
First, a grey node in the AG can belong to only one state in
the Markov Game. This ensures that the players do not dou-
ble count an exploit in the system. Second, all the grey nodes
Figure 3: Sample Transition from s1 to s2 when the attacker
chooses to exploit an LDAP vulnerability and the defender
chooses not to monitor because of resource constraints.
in the AG belong to at least one state in the Markov Game.
This ensures that no known vulnerability (or attack path to
the goal) is missed out. Note that we can choose to consider
the entire attack graph as a single state in our Markov Game
formulation.
In our example cloud network, we have four states as
shown in Figure 2. The state s3 is a terminal state which has
only one action for both the players and gives a high positive
reward to the attacker and by the assumption that we have a
zero-sum game, a high negative reward to the defender.
Players and Action Sets
The action set for the defender P1 consists of placing an IDS
system for detecting specific attacks targeted to exploit the
known vulnerabilities in the system. We denote this as, for
example, mon-FTP, which means that the defender has de-
ployed a snort like the defense mechanism for monitoring
traffic on the FTP port in the particular state. We also use
host-based intrusion detection systems like auditd for mon-
itoring access to specific files (like /etc/passwd which
we do not expect to be accessed) on our system. The actions
available to the defender in state s1 for our example scenario
is shown in Table 2.
The action set for the attacker P2 consists of known vul-
nerabilities present in the cloud system. Although these cor-
respond to exploiting particular CVEs, we use notations,
such as exp-Web to mean that the attacker uses CVE-2017-
5059 to exploit the web server, for simplicity. In the sub-
section on case-study of a real-world system, we discuss in
detail how one can automatically find the known vulnerabil-
ities present in a system. Both the defender and the attacker
has to actions in their action set that denote no activity from a
particular player (called no-mon and no-op respectively).
Transitions
An example transition in our Markov Game is shown in Fig-
ure 3, where players are in state s0. The attacker has root ac-
cess on an LDAP server (the state) and has two actions avail-
able to them– exploit the vulnerability in the LDAP server
or do nothing (for the fear of getting detected). On the other
hand, the defender has two actions–either to deploy an IDS
that actively monitors an attack on the LDAP server or not
monitor at all (due to resource and performance constraints).
In the transition shown in Fig 3, when the attacker exploits
LDAP and the defender is not monitoring, the attacker has
P1 (Defender)
no-mon mon-Web mon-FTP
no-op 0, 0 2,−2 3,−3
P2 (Atk.) exp-Web 7,−7 −5, 5 10,−10
exp-FTP 10,−10 10,−10 −7, 7
Table 2: Reward (R2, R1) for state s1
no-mon mon-LDAP
no-op 0, 0 3,−3
exp-LDAP 5,−5 −5, 5
no-mon mon-FTP
no-op 0, 0 2,−2
exp-FTP 10,−10 −8, 8
Table 3: Reward (R2, R1) for states s0 (left) and s2 (right).
a 50% chance of successfully exploiting it. These probabil-
ities are calculated using the procedure in (?) in which they
leverage the exploitability scores (ES) of each attack which
is possible in and from the state from which the transition
occurs. In case the attack does not succeed, the players re-
main in the same state with the remaining probability of 0.5.
Similarly, we have transition values for all the other states
and joint actions of the defender and the attacker.
Rewards
We consider the rewards for our game to be zero-sum. The
reward metrics for each state (except the terminal state) is
shown in Table 2 and 3. The reward values are obtained us-
ing (1) the impact score (IS) of a particular attack and (2)
the cost of performance degradation based on the placement
of a particular IDS at a particular point in the network. Con-
sider Table 2 and the second row that corresponds to the at-
tacker exploiting the vulnerability exp-Web, which in our
case maps to the CVE-2017-5059. If the defender does not
place IDS to detect attacks on the Web server (first row),
it gets a negative reward of −7 which is the impact of that
vulnerability. If it chooses to deploy the corresponding IDS
(second row), the attacker incurs a negative utility of−5 and
by the virtue of a zero-sum game, the defender gains a re-
ward of 5 for having stopped the ongoing attack. The reward
is short of 7 because it incurs some performance cost, in this
case, worth 2 utility points. Lastly, if the defender chooses
to deploy a monitoring service for detecting exploits on the
FTP port, it will not be able to detect an exploit on the web-
server and thus incur both the losses for (1) not detecting
the attack and (2) having spend resources to deploy an IDS
(here worth 3 utility points).
Experimental Results
In this section, we use the small network shown in Figure
2 to show the effectiveness of the optimal Markov Game
strategy against naive baseline methods that are popular in
the cybersecurity community.
Baseline Methods
• Min-Max Pure Strategy (MMPS). The defender selects
a pure strategy a1 given that the attacker selects the an
action that gives the defender the minimum value. This is
similar to the min-max computation we do for fully ob-
servable, deterministic games like chess and can be math-
ematically represented by modifying Equation 2,
V (s) = max
a1
min
a2
Q(s, a1, a2) (3)
where the pi(s) is replaced with a1. In there exists a pure
strategy min-max equilibrium for the Markov Game, i.e.
a static placement of IDS that clearly dominates any other
placement in regards to security and performance, this
would have been the optimal strategy. We do not expect
this to happen in real-world scenarios and thus, introduce
the notion of Moving Target Defense (MTD) that argues
in favor of a mixed strategy that (,as opposed to a pure
strategy) makes it harder for the attacker to second guess
the defender’s move. Having said that, MMPS is the best
static placement strategy that a defender can come up
under performance constraints and, in most cases, better
than what many network administrators use in practice.
Thus, MMPS acts as a reasonable baseline.
• Uniform Random Strategy (URS). In this, the defender
uses a uniform probability distribution over its actions (or
pure strategies) in a state. For example, consider state s1
shown in Table 2. The defender chooses the mixed strat-
egy of monitoring the FTP server, the web server or none
of them, all with the equal probability of 33.33%. Thus,
in any round, the defender rolls a three-sided fair dice and
does whatever comes up. Many researchers had claimed
that selecting between what to choose when shifting at-
tack surfaces should be done using a pure (or uniformly)
random strategy (Zhuang, DeLoach, and Ou 2014). This
has been disapproved later by (Sengupta et al. 2017a). In
this work, we use this as a baseline to reiterate that such
strategies based on intuition, as opposed to careful model-
ing of the problem at hand, can do more harm than good.
Preliminary Results with Baselines
In Figure 4, we plot the utility values in all the four states
of our game for both the baseline strategies and the opti-
mal mixed policy for our Markov Game Formulation (ob-
tained using Equation 2). As the discount factor increases,
both the players start valuing future rewards and thereby, se-
lect strategies that given them higher value in the long run.
At higher values of the discount factor (near 0.85), the high
magnitude of reward in the terminal state s3 affects the val-
ues of other states, thereby increasing the magnitude of gain.
When the discount factor is small (near 0.5), the rewards in
the future state does not have a substantial impact on the im-
mediate value of a state, thereby reducing the magnitude of
gain. In state s3, the URS, the MMPS, and the optimal mixed
strategy are all equivalent because it is a terminal state and
there is only one action for both the players.
The optimal strategy for the defender for the four different
states is as follows for the discount factor γ = 0.8:
pi(s3) : { t e r m i n a t e : 1.0}
pi(s0) : {no−mon : 0.404 , mon−LDAP: 0.596}
pi(s1) : {no−mon : 0.0 , mon−Web : 0.547 , mon−
FTP : 0.453}
pi(s2) : {no−mon : 0.0 , mon−FTP : 1.0}
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Figure 4: Defender’s value in each of the four state–s0 (top-left), s1 (top-right), s2 (bottom-left), and s3 (bottom-right).
Note that for states that are closer to the goal (s1 and s2), the
defender has 0 probability for not placing a monitoring sys-
tem. This means the risk of not monitoring attacks closer to
a goal node thereby landing up in the terminal state is much
higher than the cost for losing out on performance. On the
other hand, for states further away form the goal (s0), the de-
fender places non-zero probability for not monitoring known
attacks. In our case, these results indicate that a defender
can focus on performance at places near the entry points but
should prioritize for security in the states close to the goal.
In our example, the defender can detect only one of the
attacks. Although this can be easily addressed by adding
more pure strategies to the defender’s action set, in the worst
case, this may lead to an exponential increase in the size of
|A1|. Thus, calculating the min-max strategy becomes com-
putationally expensive. Although we can select states for our
Markov Game such that the number of actions in each state
is restricted to allow this computation, such abstraction of
the Attack Graph may not be practically meaningful. We
hope to investigate and address this issue in the future.
Complexity Analysis The value function calculated for
zero-sum Markov game in Equations (1) and (2) above is
guaranteed to converge in polynomial time given that there
is a terminal state with high reward for at least one player
from which it is impossible to transition into any other state.
The value update is more expensive that the value iteration
algorithm, in which each iteration takesO(|S|2|A|) steps be-
cause the reasoning happens over the space of joint action
space of both the players. Mentioning a tight upper bound is
hard because this reasoning involves solving a Linear Pro-
gram. Given that in the case of cyber security applications,
the transition function is sparse (because not all actions are
applicable in all state), we can get significant gains in speed.
Now, we show a more involved and realistic example on a
small-scale cloud network.
Case Study: MTD Against Advanced Persistent
Threats
The attacker performs a multi-stage attack, targeting the ser-
vices at the gateway of the network first and then trying to
penetrate into internal network services. The goal of this at-
tack is to exfiltrate as much information as possible while
maintaining persistence over a long period of time. Most at-
tack detection tools just utilize signature-based tools in order
to identify the data at the border of the network. Addition-
ally, the tools are configured in an ingress filtering mode,
hence the data going out of the network is left unexamined.
Based on the standards defined by NIST and other orga-
nizations (Brewer 2014), the attack analysis from a defend-
er/security administrator’s perspective takes place in five
steps, namely: 1) Reconnaissance/ Intelligence Gathering
2) Threat Modeling 3) Vulnerability Scanning and Analysis
4) Exploitation 5) Post Exploitation
In order to simulate an APT scenario, we created a flat
network using the VM images from the Western Region Cy-
Figure 5: An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Scenario
Figure 6: Stage 2 of the APT scenario described above.
bersecurity Defense Competition (WRCCDC) (Competition
2018). The competition consists of eight Blue Teams from
different regions who face a team of experienced hackers
(Red Team) from the Industry. The goal of Blue teams is
to maintain service availability while ensuring malicious at-
tempts by Red Team members are logged and reported prop-
erly. In our experiments, we focus on how effectively we can
detect attacks by the Red teams.
We used the VM images from the competition and created
a similar environment in ASU’s Science DMZ (Chowdhary
et al. 2017). We created a flat network with IPFire (Next-
Generation Firewall) hosted at the gateway of the network
(192.168.101.0/24). The VM has the capability to imple-
ment traditional Firewall filtering capability. Additionally,
the VM has integrated VPN, Snort IDS, Web Proxy for
threat detection at different levels of the protocol stack. We
now describe the various stages of APT (loosely based on
NIST model) arried out by the Red Teams over an extended
period of time:
Stage1: Slow and Low Weak Authentication Exploit
The attacker performs social engineering on website forums
frequented by employees of the company. One of the devel-
oper’s posts a question regarding a key update function for
OpenSSH functionality with a specific version (3.3). The at-
tacker identifies this version as being vulnerable to authen-
tication based attack, which can exploit a buffer-overflow
VM Vulnerability CVE CIA AC
Firewall SSH Buffer
Overflow
CVE-2017-
6542
7.5 MEDIUM
Win
2012
Eternal Blue
SMB
MS17-010 9.3 HIGH
Remote Code
Execution
MS15-034 10.0 HIGH
Debian Anonymous
FTP Login
CVE-1999-
0497
6.4 MEDIUM
Win 7 MSRPC Ser-
vice Enumer-
ation
CVE-2008-
4250
5.0 MEDIUM
NVT OS End
of Life
CVE-2008-
4114
10.0 HIGH
CentOS
6
OpenSSL
MITM
CVE-2017-
3737
6.8 MEDIUM
Table 4: Vulnerability Information for the APT scenario.
vulnerability by sending a well-defined payload to the SSH
server hosted at the gateway of the network. In our case,
we already knew the vulnerable OpenSSH service. We con-
sider this as the first step of a multi-stage attack (see Figure
5). This represents a scenario how both the players become
aware of a known vulnerability present in the system.
Stage 2: Exploiting Windows 7 VM 172.16.0.22 The
attacker probes the network and identifies the services and
OS versions running on the hosts in the network. In our
setup, the corporate access control policy allows only Win-
dows systems to interact with resources such as FTP, Web
Servers. Thus, the attacker needs to obtain access to a root
shell on one of the Windows machines. In order to accom-
plish this, the attacker must target the MS 017 10 vulnera-
bility present on a Windows 2012 R2 server-GRU as shown
in Figure 6, which hosts other services such as Active Direc-
tory and Domain Name Server (DNS).
Stage 3: Exploiting vsftpd vulnerability and exfiltrating
data The vsftpd service running on machine Dave has
a Debian operating system. The vulnerability on the FTP
server can be exploited by the attacker and they can create a
backdoor channel to exfiltrate data from FTP server to their
command and control center (C&C). Since most organiza-
tions have no egress filtering policies for the corporate fire-
wall, so data exfiltration often goes unnoticed. Additionally,
the attacker can distribute the data transfer over a period of
several weeks even if there is some signature-based rule on
IDS to prevent data exfiltration.
Stage 4: Post Exploitation The attacker can either use the
meterpreter (a Kali Linux tool) shell on Windows host to
perform privilege escalation and disrupt services if they are
a rogue insider or use the windows machine as a jump point
for exploiting other machines. The rationale behind exploit-
ing Windows machine first is that Windows acts as a domain
controller for many other machines in the network.
Attack Analysis and Results
The Blue team identified the following vulnerabilities on the
network VMs as shown in the table below. The attacker can
have one or more attack goals. One goal of the attack is to
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Figure 7: Defender’s value in each of the state s2 as discount
factor increase. In this state, we consider a sub-system of the
entire cloud network in which the defender can place five
possible detection systems but chooses to place two out of
the five for performance considerations.
ex-filtrate files from the Debian machine (Dave). Another
goal can be to target CentOS 6 (Kevin) and disrupt the Do-
main Name Server (DNS) for the private network. This will
in effect lead to service unavailability.
We show the values a defender, i.e. the Blue Team, ob-
tains if they use an optimal strategy for placement of detec-
tion systems for state s2. This state had five possible vul-
nerabilities and thus, five possible IDS for detecting them
(see Fig. 7). We let the defender provide a limit on the num-
ber of IDS systems they can place in this state or sub-net
(which was two). We saw that, in comparison to the Uni-
form Random placement strategy in the sub-network repre-
sented by state s2, the optimal strategy for the Markov Game
yielded better values. Note that our Markov Game formula-
tion treats the number of IDS placed in this subnet inde-
pendently; regardless of how many IDS systems are placed
in other parts of the cloud system. This addresses a major
shortcoming of previous research (Venkatesan et al. 2016;
Sengupta et al. 2018) in which some pure strategies can
place multiple IDS on the same subnet, thereby affecting
its performance, which quality of service in other subnets
are not impacted. For APT scenarios, even though the Blue
team needs comprehensive logging and monitoring using
IDS systems at the granularity of each subnet as well as
hosts, monitoring every packet in a cloud network is waste-
ful in terms of networking and compute resources. We found
that the min-max strategy proposed by Markov Game solver
in our current work helps in optimizing the number of detec-
tion agents while ensuring a high detection rate.
Conclusion and Future Work
A cloud network is composed of heterogeneous network de-
vices and applications interacting with each other. The in-
teraction of these entities poses both (1) a security risk to
overall cloud infrastructure and (2) makes it difficult to se-
cure them. While traditional security solutions provide secu-
rity mechanisms to detect threats, they fail to reason about
multi-stage attacks and at the same time, ignore the perfor-
mance impact on the cloud system. To address these con-
cerns, we presented a zero-sum Markov Game that provides
an intelligent strategy to place detection mechanisms that
does maximizes detection of vulnerabilities while consider-
ing the performance impact on the cloud network. We show
that our methods perform better that static placement mech-
anisms and Moving Target Defense with Uniform Random
Strategy. Lastly, we show how our method can be used for a
small scale real-world cloud system.
In the future, we plan to consider the case of general sum
games because often, the rewards of the attacker are not ex-
actly opposite to that of the defender (Sengupta et al. 2017b).
In such cases, the notion of min-max equilibrium becomes
a little more involved. We also plan to relax that assump-
tion that the transition function of the formulated Markov
Game is accurately defined by normalizing the Exploitabil-
ity Scores. Lastly, we also plan to consider the case of zero
day attacks, which upon discovery modifies the underlying
attack graph and thereby, the formulated Markov Game.
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